Digital signatures are perhaps the most important base for authentication and trust relationships in large scale systems. More specifically, various applications of signatures provide privacy and anonymity preserving mechanisms and protocols, and these, in turn, are becoming critical (due to the recently recognized need to protect individuals according to national rules and regulations). A specific type of signatures called "signatures with efficient protocols", as introduced by Camenisch and Lysyanskaya (CL), efficiently accommodates various basic protocols and extensions like zero-knowledge proofs, signing committed messages, or re-randomizability. These are, in fact, typical operations associated with signatures used in typical anonymity and privacy-preserving scenarios. To date there are no "signatures with efficient protocols" which are based on simple assumptions and truly practical. These two properties assure us a robust primitive: First, simple assumptions are needed for ensuring that this basic primitive is mathematically robust and does not require special ad hoc assumptions that are more risky, imply less efficiency, are more tuned to the protocol itself, and are perhaps less trusted. In the other dimension, efficiency is a must given the anonymity applications of the protocol, since without proper level of efficiency the future adoption of the primitives is always questionable (in spite of their need). In this work, we present a new CL-type signature scheme that is rerandomizable under a simple, well-studied, and by now standard, assumption (SXDH). The signature is efficient (built on the recent QA-NIZK constructions), and is, by design, suitable to work in extended contexts that typify privacy settings (like anonymous credentials, group signature, and offline e-cash). We demonstrate its power by presenting practical protocols based on it.
INTRODUCTION
Digital signatures are one of the fundamental cryptographic building blocks used in countless applications. The design of privacy-preserving protocols often requires signature schemes that are compatible with other primitives, primarily zero-knowledge proofs. Namely, it should be possible to sign messages without affecting their algebraic structure (in particular, without hashing them), in a way that maintains a signature holder's capability of efficiently proving statements about hidden messagesignature pairs. Primitives like "structure-preserving signatures" [1, 39] or "signatures with efficient protocols" [18] were designed exactly in this spirit. While the former are motivated by security proofs in the standard model via the Groth-Sahai proof systems [32] , the latter aim at enabling truly practical schemes.
Signature schemes with efficient protocols by Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [18] typically extend the functionalities of ordinary digital signatures in two ways: (i) They provide a protocol whereby a signer can obliviously sign a committed message known only to the user; (ii) Users should be able to efficiently prove possession of a hidden message-signature pair in a zero-knowledge manner. The latter property has proved extremely useful in the design of many efficient anonymity-related protocols such as anonymous credentials [21, 17] , compact e-cash [16] , revocable group signatures [43] , oblivious transfer with access control [15] or certified private set intersection protocols [20] .
The quality of a signature scheme is measured in two dimensions (and interactions thereof): first, the simplicity of the cryptographic assumption on which it is based, and secondly, its computational efficiency. So far, regarding cryptographic assumptions, most signature schemes with efficient protocols either require groups of hidden order [18] -where elements need a longer representation to keep the group order hidden -or they rely on nonstandard hardness assumptions [19, 4, 45] in groups with a bilinear maps (or both since the Strong RSA assumption [5] , which [18] relies on, is usually not recognized as standard). Camenisch and Lysyanskaya (CL) [19] showed how to adapt their Strong-RSA-based scheme in pairing-friendly groups. Their scheme, however, relies on the interactive LRSW assumption [42] . Moreover, as pointed out in [46] , it requires O(n) group elements to sign messages made of blocks. Pointcheval and Sanders [46] recently modified CL signatures to sign -block messages using O(1) group elements, but their scheme is only proven secure in the generic group model. While the first CL signature [18] has a natural counterpart [4, 45] based on a non-interactive assumption, it still requires a non-standard "q-type" assumption [13] where the number of input elements depends on the number of adversarial queries. We note that here we call all the above assumptions "non standard" (whether they are employed in the regular or random oracle models). For the time being, we are only aware of two schemes based on fixed-size assumptions. The first one is a variant, due to Gerbush et al. [33] , of Camenisch-Lysyanskaya signatures [19] in composite order groups. Due to its much larger group order, it is inherently much less efficient than solutions in prime-order groups: for equivalent security levels, Freeman estimates [29] that computing a pairing over groups of order N = pq is at least 50 times slower than the same pairing in the prime order setting. The second construction is a scheme, proposed by Yuen et al. [49] under the Decision Linear assumption [14] . Unfortunately, unlike LRSW-based Camenisch-Lysyanskaya signatures [19] , it is deficient as it does not provide "randomizable signatures," an important property which -in the context of group signatures, for instance -enables re-randomization of credentials across distinct privacy-preserving authentications, and allows for a better efficiency.
Our Contribution. In this paper, we propose a new signature scheme with efficient protocols and rerandomizable signatures under simple, well-studied assumptions.
The security of our scheme is proved in the standard model under the Symmetric eXternal Diffie-Hellman (SXDH) assumption, which is a wellestablished, constant-size assumption (i.e., described using a constant number of elements, regardless of the number of adversarial queries) in groups with a bilinear map. Remarkably, we can sign -block messages using only 4 group elements under the SXDH assumption.
Our signature length is enabled by the use of efficient Quasi-Adaptive Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge (QA-NIZK) arguments for linear subspaces. As introduced by Jutla and Roy [34] , QA-NIZK arguments are computationally sound proofs where the common reference string (CRS) may depend on the language of which membership must be proved. It was shown [40, 35, 38 ] that, for the task of arguing that a vector of group elements belongs to some linear subspace, the size of arguments may be independent of the dimensions of the considered subspace. Our signature scheme crucially exploits this observation as -block messages are signed by generating a QA-NIZK argument for a subspace of dimension O( ).
Our signature natively supports efficient privacyenhancing protocols. We describe a two-party protocol allowing a user to obtain a signature on a committed multi-block message as well as a honest-verifier zeroknowledge protocol for efficiently demonstrating knowledge of a signature on a committed message revealing neither the message nor the signature. Hence, our scheme readily enables the design of an efficient anonymous credentials system based on the sole SXDH assumption.
As another application of our signature scheme, we describe a truly practical group signature (for dynamic groups) based on simple assumptions in the random oracle model. Our scheme is competitive with the best solutions [14, 27] based on non-interactive assumptions (which are those relying on the Strong Diffie-Hellman assumption [13] ) in terms of computational cost and signature length. Concretely, at the 128-bit security level, each signature fits within 320 bytes while providing anonymity in the strongest sense (i.e., against adversaries equipped with a signature opening oracle). To the best of our knowledge, the new scheme thus features the shortest group signatures based on standard assumptions. It seems that our signature scheme has many other potential applications. For example, combining it with the ideas of [16] and a pseudo-random function based on standard assumptions (e.g., [44] ) readily gives a compact e-cash system based on simple hardness assumptions.
Related Work. Anonymous credentials were introduced by Chaum [21] and efficiently designed by Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [17, 18] . They involve credential issuers and users who have a long-term secret key and pseudonyms which can be seen as commitments to their secret key. Users can obtain credentials from an issuer which only knows their pseudonym and obliviously certifies their secret key along with (optionally) a set of associated attributes. Users can subsequently interact with service providers -who know them under a different pseudonym -and demonstrate possession of the issuer's signature on their secret key without leaking anything else. Anonymous credentials involve a protocol allowing the user to obtain the issuer's signature on a committed message, a protocol for proving that two commitments open to the same message and a protocol for proving possession of a signature on a committed message.
Camenisch and Lysyanskaya gave the first efficient solutions based the Strong RSA assumption [17, 18] . Variants based on bilinear maps were considered in, e.g., [19, 2] . In the non-interactive setting (i.e., without interactive conversations between provers and verifiers) solutions in the standard model were given in [7, 6] . As a matter of fact, all truly practical solutions [18, 19, 2] require non-standard ad hoc assumptions.
Group signatures are a central privacy primitive, coined by Chaum and van Heyst [22] , where members of a group managed by some authority can sign messages messages in the name of the group. Group member's accountability is enforced by means of an opening authority that can identify misbehaving signers. Ateniese, Camenisch, Joye and Tsudik [3] provided the first viable solution meeting the natural security requirements of the primitive, although rigorous security definitions were not available yet. These appeared later on in the work of Bellare, Micciancio and Warinschi [9] , which [36, 11] subsequently extended to the dynamic setting. In these models, efficient schemes have been put forth in the random oracle model [36, 27] and the standard model [31] . As of now, however, a truly practical solution based on constant-size assumptions in the random oracle model remains lacking.
BACKGROUND
Notations. We let G,Ĝ, GT denote groups of prime order p ≥ 2 λ where λ ∈ N is the security parameter.
Bold capital letters will denote matrices, like M, and bold lowercase letters stand for vectors, like v.
Hardness Assumptions
We use bilinear maps e : G ×Ĝ → GT over groups of prime order p where e(g,ĥ) = 1 G T iff g = 1 G andĥ = 1Ĝ. We rely on hardness assumptions that are non-interactive and described using a constant number of elements. Definition 1. The Decision Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem in G, is to distinguish the distributions (g a , g b , g ab ) and (g a , g b , g c ), with a, b, c R ← Zp. The DDH assumption is the intractability of the problem for any PPT distinguisher.
The SXDH assumption posits the hardness of DDH in G andĜ, when G =Ĝ. We also rely on the following problem, which generalizes the Discrete Logarithm problem to asymmetric pairings. Definition 2. In bilinear groups (G,Ĝ, GT ) of prime order p, the Symmetric Discrete Logarithm (SDL) problem consists in, given (g,ĝ, g a ,ĝ a ) ∈ G ×Ĝ where
Quasi-Adaptive NIZK Arguments for Linear Subspaces
Quasi-Adaptive NIZK (QA-NIZK) proofs [34] are NIZK proofs where the common reference string (CRS) may depend on the language for which proofs have to be generated. Formal definitions are given in [34, 40, 38] . This section recalls the QA-NIZK argument of [38] for proving membership in the row space of a matrix. In the description below, we assume that all algorithms take as input the description of common public parameters cp consisting of asymmetric bilinear groups (G,Ĝ, GT , p) of prime order p > 2 λ , where λ is the security parameter. In this setting the problem is to convince that v is a linear combination of the rows of a given M ∈ G t×n . Kiltz and Wee [38] suggested the following construction which simplifies [40] and remains secure under SXDH. We stress that cp is independent of M = ( M1 · · · Mt)
T .
Keygen(cp, M ): Given public parameters cp = (G,Ĝ, GT , p) and the matrix M = (Mi,j) ∈ G t×n .
Then, chooseĝz R ←Ĝ. Pick tk = (χ1, . . . , χn) R ← Z n p and computeĝj =ĝz χ j , for all j = 1 to n.
t , for some witness ω1, . . . , ωt ∈ Zp, parse crs as above and return π = 
Verify(crs, v, π): Given π ∈ G and v = (v1, . . . , vn), return 1 if and only if (v1, . . . , vn) = (1 G , . . . , 1 G ) and π satisfies 1 G T = e(π,ĝz) · n j=1 e(vj,ĝj). The proof of the soundness of this QA-NIZK argument system requires the matrix M to be witness-samplable. This means that the reduction has to know the discrete logarithms of the group elements of M. This requirement is compatible with our security proofs.
A RANDOMIZABLE SIGNATURE ON MULTI-BLOCK MESSAGES
In [41] , Libert et al. described an F-unforgeable signature based on the SXDH assumption. We show that their scheme implies an efficient ordinary digital signature which makes it possible to efficiently sign multiblock messages in Z p while keeping the scheme compatible with efficient protocols. In order to keep the signature length independent of the number of blocks, we exploit the property that the underlying QA-NIZK argument [38] has constant size, regardless of the dimensions of the considered linear subspace. Moreover, we show that their scheme remains unforgeable under the SXDH assumption.
where
The private key is sk := ω and the public key is
Sign(sk, m = (m1, . . . , m )) : given the private key sk = ω and a message m ∈ Z p , choose s R ← Zp to compute
Then, run Prove of the QA-NIZK argument to prove that the following vector of G
+4
(σ1, σ
Return the signature σ = σ1, σ2, σ3, π ∈ G 4 .
Verify(pk, σ, m) : parse σ as above and m as a tuple (m1, . . . , m ) in Z p and return 1 if and only if
The signature on scalars thus only consists of 4 elements in G while the verification equation only involves a computation of 5 pairings. Theorem 1. The above signature scheme is existentially unforgeable under chosen-message attacks (eu-cma) if the SXDH assumption holds in (G,Ĝ, GT ). (A sketch of proof is available in Appendix A and the full proof can be found in the full version of the paper.)
COMPANION PROTOCOLS
In this section, we give Σ protocols for issuing a signature on a committed multi-block message and for proving knowledge of a valid message-signature pair.
Σ-Protocols
As defined by Cramer [23] , Σ protocols are three-move honest-verifier zero-knowledge protocols where the first and last messages are sent by the prover. Definition 3.
[23] A Σ protocol for an NP language L : {s | ∃w : L(s, w) = 1} is a pair of interactive algorithms (P, V ) that work as follows. On input (s, w) for P and s for V , the following interaction takes place:
1. P outputs a "commitment" com to the verifier.
2. V selects a "challenge" chall uniformly at random from a challenge space and sends it to the prover.
3. P sends a "response" resp and halts.
Eventually, V evaluates a predicate Verify on the statement s and the transcript (com, chall, resp) and returns 0 or 1, then halts.
Beyond the completeness requirement (i.e., an honest run between P (s, w) and V (s) always accepts if L(s, w) = 1), the following security properties should be satisfied:
Special soundness A matching pair of transcripts w.r.t. a statement s is a pair trans1 = (com1; chall1; resp 1 ) and trans2 = (com2; chall2; resp 2 ) which are both accepting conversations, com1 = com2 but chall1 = chall2. A Σ protocol has special soundness if there is an extractor Extract that takes as input a statement s and a matching pair of transcripts (trans1; trans2) and returns a witness w such that L(s; w) = 1.
Special honest verifier ZK A Σ protocol has special honest verifier zero knowledge (SHVZK) if there is a simulator Sim that takes as input a statement s (that may or may not be valid) and a challenge chall and outputs a transcript (com; chall; resp) using the challenge provided such that Verify(s; (com; chall; resp)) = 1. Furthermore, transcripts produced by the simulator for correct statements s are indistinguishable from transcripts produced by P and V on input s, where P additionally has any witness w for s as input.
Several techniques [26, 30] are known to transform Σ protocols (SHVZK) into interactive zero-knowledge proofs which remain secure against malicious verifiers.
Proof of Knowledge of a Signature on a Committed Message
We give Σ protocols for proving the knowledge of a signature-message pair (σ, m) satisfying the verification equation of the scheme of Section 3
where σ = (σ1, σ2, σ3, π) and m = (m1, . . . , m ). We note that, as shown in the proof of Theorem 1, a candidate signature (σ1, σ2, σ3, π) may satisfy the verification equation although log g (σ2) = log h (σ3). In applications to anonymous credentials, a malicious credential issuer could take advantage of this fact in attempts to break the anonymity of the scheme (e.g., by linking two authentications involving the same credential). For this reason, we consider a protocol for proving possession of a possibly maliciously generated signature.
We thus consider the case of arbitrary valid signatures that may have been maliciously computed by a signer who, e.g., aims at tracing provers across different authentications. In this setting, we can still obtain a perfect SHVZK Σ protocol to hedge against such attacks.
A first attempt to efficiently build such a protocol is to "linearize" the verification equation (4) by making sure that two witnesses are never paired together. However, we will still have to deal with (parallelizable) intermediate Σ protocols for quadratic scalar relations. Even though a quadratic pairing-product equation e(x1,â) · e(x2,ŷ) -for variables x1, x2,ŷ and constantâ -can be linearized by partially randomizing the variables so as to get the equation e(x1 · x r 2 ,â) · e(x2,ŷ ·â −r ) (which allowsŷ =ŷ ·â −r to appear in the clear), proving knowledge of a valid signature still requires proving a statement about some representation ofŷ which now appears in committed form. Somehow, going through the randomizing factorâ −r involves a quadratic relation between some known exponents to get special-soundness. To ease the entire proof we rather directly commit to the variables in G andĜ using their available generator g and g which are not among the constants of the verification equation of the signature. We additionally need an extra generator f of G whose discrete logarithm is unknown.
Commit Given (σ, m), conduct the following steps. 
3 and commit to (π, σ0, σ1, σ2, σ3) ∈ G 5 . For this purpose, choose tz, t0, t1, t2, t3
. . , 3}, and
2 ·ĝ −t 0 . 4. In order to prove (partial) knowledge of an opening to (Cz, C0, C1, C2, C3,D0), computeÊ0 =ĝz vz ·ĝ
Prove that C0 is well-formed relatively to the committed values in C1, C2 and the coins r1, r2 ∈ Zp used inD1,D2. To this end, prove knowledge of the representation C0 = C
R ← Zp and where s1, s2 ∈ Zp are the random coins used inÊ1,Ê2. 6. To prove that t4 = t0 − r1 · t2 − r2 · t3, (re-)commit to t0, t2, t3, t4 ∈ Zp by picking x2, x3, x4 R ← Zp and computing
where x0 = x2 · r1 + x3 · r2 + x4. Ensure that committed variables coincide with those of previous steps by computing
where y0, y2, y3, y4
3 · T4, re-use s1, s2 ∈ Zp from steps 2 and 5 to compute S0 = T
Finally, keep Cz ∈ G and all the random coins in aux, and output
Challenge Given com as per (5), pick ρ R ← Zp uniformly at random and return chall = ρ.
Response On inputs com, aux and chall = ρ, compute:
2. wz = ρ · tz + vz and wi = ρ · ti + vi, for i = 0 to 3;
Verify Given (com; chall; resp) return 0 if it does not parse correctly or if the following relations do not hold:
Then, return 1 if and only if
= e(C1,ĝ1) · e(C2,D1) · e(C3,D2) · e(Cz,ĝz).
It is worth noticing that no pairing evaluation is required until the final step of Verify, which is almost as efficient as the verification of underlying signatures. Moreover, the prover's first message com is of constant-size and the communication complexity of the protocol exceeds the length of the witness by a constant additive overhead.
Theorem 2. The above interactive scheme is a secure Σ protocol for the language Lsig induced by the relation Rsig(pk, ( σ, m)) = 1 if and only if Verify (pk, σ, m) = 1, where (KeyGen, Sign, Verify ) is the signature of Section 3. 2 ·ĝ −t 0 in equation (7) and regrouping the pairing factors gives
Now, expanding the commitments to group elements in G reduces this equation to
= e(σ1,ĝ1) · e(σ2,D1) · e(σ3,D2) · e(z,ĝz)
which holds true for valid witnesses whenD1 = d1 ·ĝ
Remaining verifications of items 1,2,3 follow from the correctness of the built-in Σ protocols.
Special-Soundness. Let us assume two accepting transcripts (com, ρ, resp), (com, ρ , resp ) with ρ = ρ . The special soundness of the sub-protocols involvingD1,D2 (withÊ1,Ê2) -consisting of steps 1 and 2 of Commit and step 1 of Verify -ensures the extraction of m1, . . . , m , r1, r2 satisfyingD1 = d1 ·ĝ r 1 , where d1 = g
. From step 2 of Verify, a similar argument onD0 (withÊ0) implies the extractability of (tz, t0, t1, t2, t3, t4) such thatD0 =ĝz tz ·ĝ
Moreover, together with previously extracted (r1, r2), step 2 of Verify also guarantees that t4 satisfies
We now state that quantities {σi = Ci · g −t i } i∈{1,2,3} and π = Cz · g −tz satisfy (3), so that, together with m = (m1, . . . , m ), they form a valid witness for Rsig. Namely, (σ, m) = ((σ1, σ2, σ3, π), (m1, . . . , m )) is a valid message-signature pair.
To see this, define σ0 = C0 · g −t 0 . Since equation (7) holds by hypothesis, if we expand all commitments using extracted values, we find e(σ0,ĝ) · e(Ω,ĝ 2 +4 ) −1 = e(σ1,ĝ1) · e(σ2, d1 ·ĝ r 1 ) · e(σ3, d2 ·ĝ r 2 ) · e(π,ĝz).
We are thus left with showing that σ0 = σ
or, equivalently, e(σ0,ĝ) = e(σ2,ĝ r 1 ) · e(σ3,ĝ r 2 ). Remember that, from step 2 of Verify, we know that extracted (r1, r2, t4) ∈ Z 3 p form a representation of C0 w.r.t. the base (C0, C2, g): i.e., C0 = C
and the special soundness of the subprotocol involving (T0, T2, T3, T4) tells us. First, we have a representation of these Ti's w.r.t. the basis (g, f ) ∈ G 2 which guarantees that we are working on the already extracted (t0, t2, t3, t4) involved in the expressions ofD0 and C0. Second, the verification equation (6) ensures that T0 = T Perfect SHVZK. To show this property we must build a simulator that, on input of a challenge chall = ρ ∈R Zp, emulates a valid transcript without any witness. First, we need to compute a random tuple Cz, {Ci}
constrained to satisfy the verification equation (7). 
To complete the simulated transcript, we run a parallel execution of the simulators of all Σ protocols used as subroutines. More explicitly, first pick ρ R ← Zp andm1, . . . ,m ,r1,r2, wz, w0, . . . , w4, z0, z2, z3, z4 R ← Zp. Also, choose T0, T2, T3, T4 R ← G and do the following:
This concludes the proof.
Signing a Committed Message
At a high level, the protocol involves a committer who wants to get a signature on m = (m1, . . . , m ) and first computes a commitment of the form cv = v
where u is the extra public parameter (with unknown discrete log). The signer gives back elements of the form τ1 = g ω c s v , τ2 = g s , τ3 = h s which is almost the desired signature. To get the component σ1 of the right form relatively to τ2, τ3 the committer has to remove the factor u rs from τ1. Then, the signer also sends τ0 = u s to enable removing τ r 0 . In the protocol some randomizing steps are included as well as other additional components allowing the committer to extract π, the QA-NIZK part of the signature. In the security proof of the protocol we thus have to show that the additional value τ0 = u s does not affect the unforgeability of the signature.
The protocol. At the beginning of a new run of the protocol, the committer has a vector m = (m1, . . . , m ), the public-key of the signature scheme and the extra generator u ∈ G (which can be a hashed point), the signer also has the secret key of the signature scheme but not m. To get a signature on m, the committer picks r R ← Zp and computes a perfectly hiding commitment cv = v
Besides, it also computes the elements cz = z
The signer receives these commitments and they both engage in an interactive proof of knowledge of an equal representation of cv relatively to the basis (v1, . . . , v ; u) and cz relatively to the basis (z2, . . . , z +1 ; u), where the signer plays the role of the verifier. Depending on the success of the proof the signer computes what we can call a "pre-signature" consisting of the following group elements
In the final step, the user received the pre-signature, then picks s R ← Zp and computes (σ1, σ2, σ3, π) ∈ G 4 as follows
Finally the user checks the validity of the signature. Depending on the validity, the user outputs the signature or a failure symbol ⊥. We notice that the number of transmitted group elements is constant and no pairing is needed before the signature verification phase. In comparison, the construction of [18] requires groups of larger hidden order and their protocol for signing committed message blocks requires a linear number of range proofs.
Security. We briefly sketch the proof of the above protocol in front of malicious entities since classical arguments can be applied. Assuming that the committer uses secure ZKPK and does not output ⊥, a malicious signer which receives perfectly hiding commitments cv, cz cannot tell apart an honest proof from a simulated proof. Consequently the signer learns nothing from m during the execution of the protocol. In the other case, we have to show that a corrupted committer remains unable to produce valid signature on a new vector m . First, since the generation of u is not under the controlled of the committer but of the random oracle, u can be made independent of rest of pk. Then, we only need to show that the signature remains unforgeable when τ0 is given in the signature. Since m and s can be extracted from the proof of knowledge the reduction can output a signature on m. Moreover it is easy to see from the security proof (in Appendix A) of the signature how this additional element can be simulated. Actually the only place in the reduction where τ0 could not be computed directly as u s for a known s is when the challenger B has to embed an SXDH challenge in a simulated signature. Given (g, h, g b , h b+c ), B can compute u = g au h bu from random au, bu ← Zp and program the random oracle to output this element u as the specification of the public-key would do. Then to simulate τ0 B simply has to compute τ0 = (g b ) au (h b+c ) bv = u b h c·bv which is u b or random. The rest of the reduction remains unchanged since the value au, bu are completely independent of those already described in the sketch of proof in Appendix A.
Remark. Since a malicious signer may know the simulation trapdoor tk = {χi}
+4
i=1 of the underlying QA-NIZK argument, he could produce valid signature so that log g σ2 = log h σ3. Then, if the committer later needs to proof knowledge of the received signature it then has to use the sigma protocol of Section 3 where both σ2 and σ3 only appear in committed form.
DYNAMIC GROUP SIGNATURES
We adapt the protocol of section 3 to build a dynamic group signature [11, 36] .
At a high level, each group member obtains a membership certificate consisting of a signature (σ1, σ2, σ3, π) on a message ID ∈ Zp which is only known to the group member. During the joining protocol, each group member thus obtains a signature on a committed message ID ∈ Zp. Here, we use a deterministic commitment to ID, which suffices to ensure security against framing attacks and allows for a better efficiency. When signing a message, each group member verifiably encrypts the components (σ1, π) of his membership certificate that depend on ID (and not σ2, σ3 which can be assumed to be honestly computed here, unlike in the previous section). For the sake of efficiency, we use a randomness re-using [8] variant of the CramerShoup encryption scheme [25] whereby σ1 and π are both encrypted using the same encryption exponent θ ∈ Zp. For public verifiability purposes, the validity of CramerShoup ciphertexts is demonstrated using Σ protocols and the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [28] (somewhat in the fashion of [48] ) rather than designated verifier NIZK proofs [25] .
In the join protocol, the user proves knowledge of his membership secret ID ∈ Zp in a zero-knowledge manner, which restricts the group manager to sequentially interact with prospective users. However, this limitation can be removed using an extractable commitment as in [27] .
Keygen(λ, N ): given λ ∈ N, and the maximum number of users N ∈ poly(λ), choose asymmetric bilinear groups cp = (G,Ĝ, GT , p) of order p > 2 λ . 1. Generate a key pair (pk s , sks) for the scheme of section 3 for a one-block message (i.e., = 1). The secret key is sks = ω, while the public key is
where crs = {zj} 
3. Choose a hash function H : {0, 1} * ×G 10 ×GT → Zp that will be modeled as a random oracle. 4. Define Y = pk s , Xz, Xσ, X ID to be the group public key. The group manager's private key is S GM = ω = sks whereas the opening authority's private key consists of SOA = xz, yz, xσ, yσ, x ID , y ID .
The group manager GM, and the prospective user Ui run the following interactive protocol: 1. Ui chooses ID R ← Zp and sends the following to GM:
GM checks that V ID does not appear in any transcript of St and abort if it does. Otherwise (i.e., if V ID is fresh), GM verifies that: for k = 2, 4,
If all tests pass, samples a fresh index i ∈ Zp and sends it to Ui, otherwise abort. 3. Ui runs an interactive zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of ID = log v (V ID ) in interaction with GM.
For instance, the 4-round protocol of Cramer et al. [24] can be used for this purpose. Let πK (ID) denote the interaction transcript. 4. GM uses V ID = v ID to sign ID using the scheme of section 3: i.e., GM picks s R ← Zp, and uses
Then GM uses Z ID to generate the QA-NIZK proof π ∈ G as
and finally sends certi = (i, V ID , σ1, σ2, σ3, π)
5. Finally GM and Ui respectively store (8) and (certi, seci) = (i, V ID , σ1, σ2, σ3, π), ID .
Sign(Y, seci, certi, M ): Given a message M ∈ {0, 1} * and a secret seci = ID, the user Ui does the following:
1. Re-randomize the certificate certi. Namely, choose r
Encrypt elementsπ,σ1 and v
ID from the membership certificate. Specifically, choose θ R ← Zp and compute the Cramer-Shoup ciphertext C CS = (C1, C2, Cz, Cσ, C ID ), where
3. Then, prove knowledge (c, ID, s θ ) such that
e(Cz,ĝz) · e(Cσ,ĝ1) · e(σ2,ĝ3) · e(σ3,ĝ5)
= e(Xz,ĝz) · e(Xσ,ĝ1) θ · e(σ2,ĝ2) · e(σ3,ĝ4) −ID .
Namely, sample random r ID , r θ 
and the element R4 ∈ GT as e(Xz,ĝz) · e(Xσ,ĝ1) s θ · e(σ2,ĝ2) · e(σ3,ĝ4)
2. Finally, return 1 if and only if it holds that c = H(M, C CS ,σ2,σ3, R1, R2, R3, R4).
Open(Y, S OA , M, Σ): Given a pair (M, Σ) and the OA's private key SOA = xz, yz, xσ, yσ, x ID , y ID :
2. Search V ID in the database of joining transcripts (8) and check that it corresponds to a valid signature σ1,σ2,σ3,π for the committed value V ID . If so, return the corresponding i, otherwise return ⊥.
It is possible to spare one group element in the signature by eliminating the encryption C ID of v ID which is only used to open signatures in constant time. Then, the opening algorithm has to check for each transcript if (σ1,σ2,σ3,π) corresponds to the identifier ID embedded in (σ1,Ĝ 2,ID ,Ĝ 4,ID ) by testing the relation 1 ? = e(π,ĝz)·e(σ1,ĝ1)·e(σ2,Ĝ 2,ID ·ĝ3)·e(σ3,Ĝ 4,ID ·ĝ5)·e(Ω,ĝ6).
This results in a modified opening algorithm which takes O(N ) in the worst-case. In applications where signature openings are infrequent, this is acceptable.
Security
Theorem 3. If SXDH holds in (G,Ĝ, GT ), the scheme is CCA-anonymous in the random oracle model.
Proof. We use a sequence of games where, for each i, Wi is the event that the adversary A wins in Game i. At the first transition, we need to rely on the security of the computational soundness of the QA-NIZK argument of Section 2.2 which relies on the SXDH assumption, sinceσ2 andσ3 appear un-encrypted in each group signature. Game 0: This is the real CCA-anonymity game. In the challenge phase, the adversary outputs two valid membership certificates and membership secrets (cert 0 , sec 0 ), (cert 1 , sec 1 ) and obtains a challenge signature which the challenger computes us-
We define W0 to be the event that the adversary outputs d = d.
Game 1:
This game is as Game 0, except that the challenger B aborts in the event, which we call F1, that A chooses membership certificates cert 0 , cert 1 for which one of the underlying signatures σ 1 , σ 2 , σ 3 , π correctly verifies but log g (σ 2 ) = log h (σ 3 ). This implies that the vector
is outside the row space of the matrix M (1), so that F1 would contradict the soundness of the QA-NIZK proof of [38] (via the same arguments as in Theorem 9 of [41] since the matrix can be witness-samplable here) and thus the DDH assumption inĜ. We have
Game 2:
We change the way to generate the challenge signature Σ . Instead of faithfully running the Schnorr-like protocol, we use the HVZK-simulator to produce the proofs s θ , s ID without knowing the witnesses θ, ID. Namely, we pick c, s θ , s ID R ← Zp at random and set R1 = g
ID as well as R4 ∈ GT as in (11) . Then, we program the random oracle and assign the output c to the hash value H(M, C CS ,σ2,σ3, R1, R2, R3, R4). In the unlikely event that this value was previously defined (which only happens with probability at most 1/p 3 ), the challenger aborts. Thus
Game 3: We modify again the generation of the challenge signature Σ . Namely, the challenger computes Cz, Cσ, C ID using S OA as follows
The distribution of (Cz, Cσ, C ID ) remains the same and we have Pr[W3] = Pr[W2].
Game 4: Here, we modify the distribution of the challenge signature and replace C2 = h θ by C2 = h θ+θ , for a randomly chosen θ
Game 5: We introduce one more change. Instead of sampling h ∈R Zp, the challenger chooses a random α R ← Zp at the beginning of the game, sets h = g α and retains the information α = log g (h) (note that we are done with the DDH assumption and we can henceforth use α = log g (h)). At each signature opening query, the challenger returns ⊥ on any signature Σ = (C1, C2, Cz, Cσ, C ID ,σ2,σ3, c, s ID , s θ ) such that C2 = C α 1 . Game 5 remains the same as Game 4. until the event E5 that A queries the opening of a signature that properly verifies although C2 = C α 1 . Lemma 2 states that Pr[E5] ≤ qO·qH /p, where qO is the number of opening queries and qH is the number of random oracle queries.
In Game 5, Σ perfectly hides (π,σ1, v ID ). Indeed,
and (yσ, yz, y ID ) ∈ Z 3 p are completely independent of A's view. The only way for A to infer information about (yσ, yz, y ID ) is to make opening queries on signatures such that C2 = C 
which concludes the proof. Lemma 1. In Game 4, the adversary A wins the anonymity game with negligibly different probabilities than in Game 3 if the DDH assumption holds in G.
Proof. Let us assume that an adversary A wins with noticeably different probabilities in Game 4 and Game 3. We then construct a DDH distinguisher B from A.
Our reduction B takes as input a DDH instance (g a , g b , η), where η = g a(b+c) and has to decide with nonnegligible probability ε whether c = 0 or c ∈R Zp. To achieve this, B sets h = g a and computes the challenge signature as C1 = g b and C2 = η. The rest of the game continues like in Game 3 (which is also the same as in Proof. This proof uses idea similar to the security proof of the Katz-Wang [37] signature scheme. In Game 5, event E5 happens if log g (C1) = log h (C2) and the verification equations (10) and (11) holds. In particular, we
2 , which can be interpreted as a linear system with unknowns (c,
We can assume w.l.o.g. that each opening query is preceded by the corresponding random oracle query (otherwise, the reduction can simply make the hash query for itself). The input of each hash query contains a pair (R1, R2) determines the non-homogeneous terms of the linear system (12) . Since log g (C1) = log h (C2), the system is full-rank, so that for each (R1, R2), there is exactly one pair (c, s θ ) ∈ Z 2 p that satisfies (12) . The probability that, in response to a random oracle query, the reduction returns the value of c which is uniquely determined by (12) is at most 1/p. For all hash queries, the probability that one of them be answered with the uniquely determined c ∈ Zq is at most qH /p. A union bound over all opening queries implies that the probability that the event E4 happens is smaller than Pr[E4] ≤ qO · qH /p.
The proof of security against misidentification attacks requires the reduction to rewind a the proof of knowledge of ID at each execution of the join protocol with the adversary attempting to escape traceability. For this reason, we need to assume that users join the system sequentially, rather than concurrently. However, this problem can be solved as in [27] by having the user send an extractable commitment to ID and non-interactively prove (via the Fiat-Shamir heuristic) that he did so correctly. This allows the reduction to extract ID without rewinding the user at each execution of Join. Then, the proof of security against framing attacks must be modified by having the reduction simulate the proof of knowledge of ID (by programming a random oracle) and rely on the hiding property of the extractable commitment.
Theorem 4. In the ROM, the scheme is secure against mis-identification attacks under the SXDH assumption in (G,Ĝ).
Proof. The proof uses the forking technique [47] which consists in implicitly rewinding the zero-knowledge proof by running the adversary twice and changing the outputs of the random oracle after the hash query that involves the forgery message. The Forking Lemma [47] -more precisely, its generalization given by Bellare and Neven [10] -ensures that, after two runs of the adversary, the reduction can extract witnesses of which knowledge is demonstrated by the signature of knowledge.
Let us assume an attacker A against the misidentification game that wins with non-negligible probability ε. We build an adversary B against the chosenmessage security of the signature scheme of section 3.
Keygen. At the key generation, B invokes its own challenger for the chosen-message security game to obtain the public key pk s for the signature scheme. pk s is embedded in the group public key Y. Except for S GM , all keys are generated as in the normal Keygen algorithm.
Join. To answer joining queries without knowing sks, B uses the knowledge extractor of the proof of knowledge of ID = log v (V ID ) to extract the identity to be signed. Namely, on a Join query, the reduction B rewinds the adversary A in order to extract the witness ID = log v (V ID ) of which A demonstrates knowledge at step 3 of the join protocol. Having extracted ID ∈ Zp, B invokes its own signing oracle on the message ID to obtain (σ1, σ2, σ3, z, r). Then, B returns certi = (i, V ID , σ1, σ2, σ3, z, r) as in a normal execution of the join protocol.
At some point, the attacker A produces a valid forgery (M , Σ = (C 1 , C 2 , C z , C σ , C ID ,σ 2 ,σ 3 , c , s ID , s θ )) for which the opening algorithm does not reveal a properly registered identity. With all but negligible probability, A must have queried the random oracle value H(M , C CS ,σ 2 ,σ 3 , R 1 , R 2 , R 3 , R 4 ) which would have been unpredictable otherwise.
Thus, B replays the adversary A with the same input and random tape as in the first run. In the second run, the random oracle is also the same until the hash query H(M , C CS ,σ 2 ,σ 3 , R 1 , R 2 , R 3 , R 4 ). At this point, the forking occurs and B outputs fresh random oracle values. By the Forking Lemma of [10] , B obtains two suitably related forgeries with non-negligible probability ε·(ε/qH −1/p). Namely, B will obtain two matching tran-
. From the responses s ID and s † ID (that necessarily involve the same identifier ID which is uniquely determined by C CS = (C 1 , C 2 , C z , C σ , C ID )), B runs the knowledge extractor of to obtain ID ∈ Zp. Namely, given (c , c , s θ , s θ , s ID , s ID ) ∈ Z Theorem 5. In the ROM, the scheme is secure against framing attacks under the SDL assumption Proof. Let us assume that a PPT adversary A can create, with advantage ε, a forgery (M , σ ) that opens to some honest user i ∈ U b who did not sign M . We give a reduction B that uses A to break SDL.
Algorithm B takes as input an SDL instance (g,ĝ, g a ,ĝ a ) and uses its interaction with the adversary A to compute a ∈ Zp. To generate the group public key Y, B runs all the steps of the real setup algorithm Keygen except step 1. At step 1, B defines the generators g,ĝ in pk s to be those of its input and computes h = g α h , v = g αv , w = g αw ,ĝz =ĝ αz for randomly chosen scalars α h , αv, αw, αz R ← Zp. In order to compute {zj} g, 1, 1, 1, 1, h), (v, g, 1, h, 1, 1) and  (w, 1, g, 1, h, 1 ). Moreover {ĝi =ĝ
are the verifying key.) As a result of this setup phase, B knows S GM = sks = ω, S OA = xz, yz, xσ, yσ, x ID , y ID and even tk. The adversary A is run on input of the group public key Y := (pk s , (Xz, Xσ, X ID ), H), which has the same distribution as in the real attack game.
Should A decide to corrupt the group manager or the opening authority during the game, B is able to reveal S GM = sks and S OA when requested. In addition, B must be able to answer the following queries.
-Q b-join -queries: At any time A can act as a corrupted group manager and introduce a new honest user i in the group by invoking the Q b-join oracle. Then, B runs Juser on behalf of the honest user in an execution of Join. At step 1 of Join, B picks a random δi R ← Zp and uses tk to compute the tuple (Vi, Zi,Ĝ2,i,Ĝ4,i), for an unknown seci = IDi = a · δi ∈ Zp, that J GM expects at step 1 of the join protocol. Namely, B computes the vector vi = (Vi, Gi, 1, Hi, 1, 1) = (v, g, 1, h, 1, 1 )
and then computes Zi as a simulated QA-NIZK proof for vi ∈ G 6 using tk. A straightforward calculation shows that Zi = z ID i 2 since the QA-NIZK argument of Section 2.2 has a deterministic proving algorithm, so that (Vi, Zi,Ĝ2,i,Ĝ4,i) successfully passes the test of step 2. As for the last two components, for each j ∈ {2, 4}, B computeŝ
j , At step 3 of Join, B simulates the interactive proof of knowledge of IDi = log v (Vi) using the simulator. In the rest of the protocol, B proceeds like the actual run and obtains certi = (i, Vi, σ1, σ2, σ3, π). Finally, B stores (certi, Zi, δi,Ĝ2,i,Ĝ4,i).
-Q sig -queries: When A requests user i ∈ U b to sign a message M , B is able to use the membership certificate certi = (i, Vi, σ1, σ2, σ3, π) to compute the ciphertext C CS at steps 1-2 of the signing algorithm. While B does not know the witness IDi = a·δi ∈ Zp to generate a proof at step 3, B is able to simulate the non-interactive proof (c, s ID , s θ ), for a randomly chosen challenge c R ← Zp by programming the random oracle. More precisely, B re-randomizes the certificate certi by picking r R ← Zp and computing
Then B encryptsπ,σ1 and Vi as in the real signing algorithm to get C CS = (C1, C2, Cz, Cσ, C ID ). Then, B chooses c, s ID , s θ ∈ Zp and computes R1, R2, R3, R4 as in (10) and (11) of Verify. Finally, B programs H to return c on inputs (M, C CS ,σ2,σ3, R1, R2, R3, R4). In the event that H is already defined at that point, B aborts. The probability to fail at one signing query is ≤ qs/p 3 , where qs is the number of signing queries.
When A halts, it presumably frames some honest user i ∈ U b by outputting a signature Σ = (C 1 , C 2 , C z , C σ , C ID ,σ 2 ,σ 3 , c , s ID , s θ ), for some message M , that opens to i ∈ U b although user i did not sign M . With high probability, A must have queried the hash value H(M , C CS ,σ 2 ,σ 3 , R 1 , R 2 , R 3 , R 4 ), which would be unpredictable otherwise. Hence, B can run A a second time with the same input and random tape. At the moment when A queries H(M , C CS ,σ 2 ,σ 3 , R 1 , R 2 , R 3 , R 4 ) in the second run, B starts responding with different random oracle values which depart from those of the initial run. The Forking Lemma of [10] ensures that, with non-negligible probability the second run will result in a forgery Σ † = (C 1 , C 2 , C z , C σ , C ID ,σ This observation tells us that, if A has advantage ε as a framing adversary making qH random oracle queries, then B implies an algorithm solving the SDL problem with probability ε(ε/qH − 1/p).
We stress that the proofs can be easily adapted to the case where the opening algorithm has linear complexity in the number of users. Table 1 compares our scheme with previous practical group signatures based on pairing-related assumptions. Since we focus on practical schemes, we only consider those in the random oracle model. To make the comparison possible, we use 256-bit group orders, so that elements of G and Zp are encoded using 256 bits each.
Comparison with Existing Schemes
The scheme of Boneh, Boyen and Shacham [14] is the first scheme providing short signatures: each signature is comprised of 3 group elements and 6 elements of Zp. However, this scheme is designed for static groups only and relies on the Strong Diffie-Hellmann assumption, which is a non-standard q-type assumption, and its anonymity is only proved in the CPA sense.
Delerablée and Pointcheval [27] presented a scheme designed for a dynamically growing group and which is also fully (i.e., CCA) anonymous. The security of their scheme is based on the eXternal Diffie-Hellman assumption (XDH), which we also use here, and the q-SDH assumption. In [27] , each signature consists of 4 group elements and 5 scalars in Zp, which leads to the same signature size as previously. They also proposed a variant to get rid of the XDH assumption at the cost of 2 more group elements and one more scalar, but they still rely on the q-SDH assumption.
Bichsel et al. [12] proposed a very short group signature for dynamic groups, where each signature consists of 3 group elements and 2 elements in Zp. The downsides are their use the LRSW assumption [42] , which is a very ad-hoc interactive assumption, and their security notion is not fully-anonymous, but is an hybrid security with selfless-anonymity, which is marked "CCA-" in Table 1 . Another caveat is that, unlike the two previous systems, the opening complexity of their scheme is linear in the number of group members.
In 2015, Pointcheval and Sanders [46] gave another instantiation of [12] based on a variant of the LRSW assumption in the asymmetric setting (meaning using only Type III pairings), which provides even shorter signatures than [12] with the same downsides. Their scheme provides signatures composed of only 2 group elements in G and 2 scalars in Zp.
Our main contribution compared to these schemes is to provide size-comparable signatures -we recall that our scheme is composed of 7 group elements and 3 scalars in Zp -while relying on standard, constant-size assumptions. Moreover, we can notice that we can save one element in G at the expense of a linear-time opening algorithm in the number N of group users (like [12] ).
